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ISBN 90-5833-306-XAbstract in English
During the last twenty years the share of researchers in the workforce has been rising in OECD
countries. In the same period, the distribution of schooling has become more equal. This paper
proposes that the rise in the proportion of researchers is caused by the decline in schooling
inequality. In particular, comparative static analysis of a semi-endogenous growth model
demonstrates that a rising proportion of researchers can be a steady state phenomenon when
schooling inequality is declining over time. This outcome can be accompanied by a rise in the
wages of high-skilled labor compared to low-skilled labor.
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Abstract in Dutch
Gedurende de laatste twintig jaar is het aandeel van onderzoekers in de beroepsbevolking
gestegen in OESO landen. In dezelfde periode is de verdeling van scholing meer gelijk
geworden. Dit artikel stelt dat de groei in het aandeel van onderzoekers het gevolg is van de
afname in scholingsongelijkheid. Comparatief statische analyse van een semi-endogeen
groeimodel toont aan dat het aandeel van onderzoekers structureel kan toenemen indien
scholingsongelijkheid afneemt. Deze uitkomst kan gepaard gaan met een toename in de lonen
van hoogopgeleidenten opzichte van de lonen van laagopgeleiden.
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56Summary
The rising proportion of researchers poses a new challenge to modeling economic growth. This
paper proposes an explanation for the rise of research that builds on the decline in schooling
inequality. The hypothesis that the rise in the proportion of researchers is caused by the decline
in schooling inequality is founded on the assumption that schooling matters more for the
productivity of researchers, than it matters for the productivity of other workers. A consequence
of this assumption is that people with a high level of education will choose to become
researchers, while people with a lower level of education will choose to become production
workers.
Whether a person will choose a job in production or a job in research depends on which job
gives her a higher income. Her income, in turn, depends on her productivity in the job she has
chosen, and on the wage rate per unit of output of that job. A change in the distribution of
schooling inﬂuences both her productivity and her wage per unit of output. Let us focus ﬁrst on
how a change in the distribution of schooling would affect the productivity of a worker who
initially is indifferent between research and production because her income is the same in both
jobs. A change in the distribution of schooling will give this ‘indifferent worker’ a comparative
advantage in either research or production, depending on how her schooling compares to the
schooling of the rest of the workforce. For example, a reduction in schooling inequality might
reduce her level of schooling compared to others. The relative decrease in her level of schooling
lowers her relative productivity in both jobs, but her loss in productivity is smallest in
production. Therefore, she would no longer be indifferent about the type of job, but instead she
would prefer a job in production – provided that wages per unit of output remain unchanged. As
a result, the proportion of researchers will decrease. I refer to this as the skill effect.
A change in the distribution of schooling not only changes the productivity of the indifferent
worker, but it also has consequences for the wage rates of both job types. Even if individual
workers would not change jobs, the aggregate labor productivityof each sector would be affected
by a change in the distribution of schooling. For example, a decline in schooling inequality
could raise the average productivity of production workers more than the productivity of
researchers. This would increase the amount of human capital available to the production sector
more than the amount available to the research sector, leading to rise in the wages for researchers
compared to the wages of production workers. The correspondingchange in wage rates makes a
job in research more attractive for the marginal worker. I refer to this as the wage effect.
In the example given above, the skill effect and the wage effect were working in opposite
directions. This is not a general result. In fact, the analysis shows that the direction of both
effects is an empirical, rather than theoretical, matter. Concerning the skill effect, I present
evidence indicating that a reduction in schooling inequality indeed makes production more
attractive for the indifferent worker. The direction of the wage effect can be inferred from
7evidence on wage inequality. The growth of the college wage premium in the United States is
consistent with a wage effect working in the opposite direction of the skill effect, leading to a
rise in the proportion of researchers.
81 Introduction
In his critique on ﬁrst generation endogenous growth models, Charles Jones has pointed out that
the observed rise in the absolute number of researchers should, according to those theories, have
led to ever-increasing rates of economic growth – not to the observed constant growth rates
(Jones, 1995b). Since then, a number of models have been proposed that are capable of linking
both empirical trends.1 More recently, Jones (2002) has drawn attention to the fact that not only
the absolute number of researchers is rising over time, but also the proportion of researchers in
the workforce. This trend is clearly visible in Figure 1.1, which shows that the aggregate number
of researchers measured in full-time equivalent units (FTEs) relative to total employment has
been rising in the OECD during the last two decades.2
The rising proportion of researchers poses a new challenge to modeling economic growth.
Responding to this challenge, Jones (2002) shows that a constant growth rate can be consistent
with a rising proportion of researchers when there are exponential returns to education. This
paper proposes an alternative explanation for the rise of research, which builds on another
empirical trend: the decline in schooling inequality. Figure 1.2 displays the evolution of the
proportions of the population that have primary, secondary, and tertiary education as the highest
attained level of education. Both the rise of tertiary education and the decline of primary
education have contributed to a greater equality in educational attainment.3
The hypothesis that the rise in the proportion of researchers is caused by the decline in
schooling inequality is founded on the assumption that schooling matters more for the
productivity of researchers, than it matters for the productivity of other workers. A consequence
of this assumption is that people with a high level of education will choose to become
researchers, while people with a lower level of education will choose to become production
workers.4
Whether a person will choose a job in production or a job in research depends on which job
gives her a higher income. Her income, in turn, depends on her productivity in the job she has
chosen, and on the wage rate per unit of output of that job. A change in the distribution of
schooling inﬂuences both her productivity and her wage per unit of output. Let us focus ﬁrst on
how a change in the distribution of schooling would affect the productivity of a worker who
1 See for example Jones (1995a); Young (1998); Peretto (1998); Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998); Howitt (1999); Li
(2000); Peretto and Smulders (2002).
2 The 24 OECD countries are listed in Table B.3. Jones (2002) presents data for G5 countries that show a rising
proportion since 1950.
3 The decline in schooling inequality has also been reported by Ram (1990), who ﬁnds that there exists an inverse
relationship between schooling inequality and the average years of schooling if the average years of schooling in a
country exceeds seven. Detailed evidence on the decline in schooling inequality is provided in section 2 of this paper.
4 The analysis put forward in this paper can be generalised by allowing some production jobs to be as sensitive to
schooling as research jobs. In this case, some workers with a higher level of education will have production jobs.





















































1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
aggregate median max, min
a Data have been interpolated at the country level; sources: OECD (MSTI), World Bank (WDI)















































1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Year
primary secondary tertiary
a Highest level of education attained; population above 25; data sources: Barro and Lee (2000), World Bank (WDI)
10initially is indifferent between research and production because her income is the same in both
jobs.5 A change in the distribution of schooling will give this ‘indifferent worker’ a comparative
advantage in either research or production, depending on how her schooling compares to the
schooling of the rest of the workforce. For example, a reduction in schooling inequality might
reduce her level of schooling compared to others. The relative decrease in her level of schooling
lowers her relative productivity in both jobs, but her loss in productivity is smallest in
production. Therefore, she would no longer be indifferent about the type of job, but instead she
would prefer a job in production – provided that wages per unit of output remain unchanged. As
a result, the proportion of researchers will decrease. I will refer to this as the skill effect.
A change in the distribution of schooling not only changes the productivity of the indifferent
worker, but it also has consequences for the wage rates of both job types. Even if individual
workers would not change jobs, the aggregate labor productivityof each sector would be affected
by a change in the distribution of schooling. For example, a decline in schooling inequality
could raise the average productivity of production workers more than the productivity of
researchers. This would increase the amount of human capital available to the production sector
more than the amount available to the research sector, leading to rise in the wages for researchers
compared to the wages of production workers. The correspondingchange in wage rates makes a
job in research more attractive for the marginal worker. I will refer to this as the wage effect.
In the example given above, the skill effect and the wage effect were working in opposite
directions. This is not a general result. In fact, the analysis shows that the direction of both
effects is an empirical, rather than theoretical, matter. Concerning the skill effect, I present
evidence indicating that a reduction in schooling inequality indeed makes production more
attractive for the indifferent worker. The direction of the wage effect can be inferred from
evidence on wage inequality (see below). The growth of the college wage premium in the United
States is consistent with a wage effect working in the opposite direction of the skill effect,
leading to a rise in the proportion of researchers.
The approach taken in this paper differs in two respects from the approach taken by Jones
(2002). The ﬁrst difference is that in Jones’ model all workers have the same level of education.
The second difference concerns the effects of growth in the average level of education. In Jones’
model, the combination of growth in the average years of schooling and growth in the population
perturbs the steady state. Jones, following Bils and Klenow (2000), incorporates Mincerian
returns to time spent on education, such that a constant absolute increase in the time spend on
education generates exponential growth in human capital. This relation introduces a scale effect
into the model, which, in the presence of population growth, causes the proportion of researchers
to rise over time. I follow Arnold (1998) and Strulik (2005) in assuming a constant growth rate
5 The existence of such an ‘indifferent worker’ is guaranteed if the level of schooling is distributed continuously over all
workers.
11for the average level of education.6 Constant exponential growth in education has approximately
the same effects as exogenous population growth and does not prevent the economy from being
in a steady state.7
One of the possible outcomes of the model presented below is that a decline in schooling
inequality raises the wage rate of researchers compared to the wage rate of production workers.
Similar results can be found in the literature on skill biased technical change8 and in the
literature on job assignment9. The absence of skill biased technological change makes my model
more closely related to the assignment models than to the models on skill biased technical
change. In particular, the ‘composition effect’ discussed by Teulings (2005) is comparable to the
‘wage effect’ mentioned above. Laitner (2000) studies the relation between the distribution of
abilities and wage inequality using a model with endogenous education and unbiased – but
exogenous – technological change.
The theoretical interest in the relation between the distribution of skills and wage inequality
largely stems from the increase in the college wage premium in the United States in the second
half of the twentieth century, which coincided with an increase in the supply of college graduates
(Katz and Murphy, 1992; Murnane et al., 1995). The focus of the theoretical literature on this
single empirical fact has yielded models that reproduce a negative relation between schooling
inequality and the wage premium. However, Goldin (1999) has pointed out that the expansion of
secondary schooling in the United States between 1910 and 1940 has led to a reduction in the
wage premium (see also Goldin and Katz 2000; 2001a; 2001b). The model presented below can
reproduce both a positive and a negative relation depending on the level of schooling inequality.
The decline in schooling inequality is estimated by ﬁtting a cumulative distribution function
to data on educational attainment. This distribution function, which is also used in the theoretical
model, is introduced in section 2. The section continues with evidence on the decline of
schooling inequality. After the basic model has been presented in section 3, its steady state will
be solved for in section 4. Section 5 starts with a discussion of the wage and skill effects and
discusses empirical indications for the direction of the two effects. Section 6 summarises the
ﬁndings.
6 Appendix A treats endogenous education.
7 Ha and Howitt (2006) observe that the growth rate of R&D workers has declined threefold since 1953, while productivity
growth has remained constant. They argue that semi-endogenous growth models are inconsistent with these
observations, but this is not the case if semi-endogenous growth is driven by advances in education. Moreover, they also
observe that a sustained fraction of GDP is devoted to R&D. Equation 5.4 shows that this is true for the model in this
paper – even if population growth is zero.
8 Acemoglu (1998; 2002), Galor and Moav (2000), Azuma and Grossman (2003)
9 Teulings (1995; 2005), Costrell and Loury (2004), Dupuy and Marey (2005)
12Table 2.1 Cumulative weighting schemes
Education w1 w2 w3 w4
None 0 0 0 0
Primary 1/3 1/2 1/4 1/4
Secondary 2/3 3/4 3/4 1/2
Tertiary 1 1 1 1
2 The decline in schooling inequality
Figure 1.2 shows that the proportion of the population with primary education only has
decreased while the proportion with tertiary education has risen. The ﬁgure also suggests that
the distribution of schooling has become more uniform over time. However, a quantiﬁcation of
this change in the shape of the distribution requires two problems to be solved. First, it is not
entirely clear how this distribution actually looks like, because “educational attainment” is an
ordinal variable. This problem can be overcome by assigning arbitrary weights to the four levels
of educational attainment. The sensitivity of the outcome of the analysis to the choice of weights
can be checked by using several weighting schemes. Table 2.1 shows the four weighting
schemes used in the estimation procedure. The ﬁrst scheme, w1, increases with the same amount
for each advance in the level of education. The second scheme puts a larger weight on primary
education, the third scheme on secondary, and the fourth on tertiary education.
A second problem that needs to be taken care of concerns the choice of a statistic that
indicates the ‘shape’ of the distribution. The approach taken here is to ﬁt a functional form to the
distribution, such that the properties of distribution are captured by the parameters of the
function.10 Because distribution function will also be used in the theoretical model, I will make
a small detour, discussing its foundations ﬁrst.
Order all people in economy according to their level of schooling. This level of schooling,
denoted by k, is one-dimensional,implying that it reﬂects some general notion of intelligence or
capability. People are indexed from 0 to L, where L is both the person with highest level of
education and the size of the population. The level of schooling of person i depends on his
relative ranking, i/L, and on the parameters s and s (s,s > 0).
k (i) = (s +1)s(i/L)
s (2.1)














10 An alternative approach is to estimate several moments of the distribution (variance, skewness, etc.). The advantage of
such an approach is that no assumptions have to be made about the type of distribution. The disadvantage is that it does
not yield a single statistic that summarises the shape of the distribution. This is particularly problematic considering the
very small number of observations.
13The chosen speciﬁcation of k has the advantage that changes in s do not affect average
schooling. The shape of the distribution of k can be altered by varying s without affecting the
mean of the distribution. The cumulative distribution function (cdf) of k, F(k), can be derived in
a straightforward manner by solving equation 2.1 for i/L. Differentiating F(k) with respect to k

















The domain of both functions runs from k(0) = 0 to k(L) = (s +1)s.11
This implies that a larger s causes the maximum schooling level to increase, even though s is
ﬁxed. A rise in s therefore widens the gap between the people without education and the people
with the highest level of education. Besides affecting the domain of k, s also affects its variance















Both the variance and coefﬁcient of variation of k are increasing in s. These properties make s
a reasonably appropriate measure of inequality and whenever I mention ‘inequality’ below, I will
implicitly refer to s.
The data on schooling are taken from the dataset compiled by Barro and Lee (2000; 2001).
The variables used are the proportion of the population above 25 for which the highest attained
level of schooling is primary, secondary, or tertiary education.12 The series have been aggregated
for 24 OECD countries using data on the size of the population from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators database.13
Figure 2.1 shows how the shape of the schooling distribution has changed between 1965 and
2000. The dots are the actual data for weighting scheme w1, the curve is the estimated cdf.14
The proposed distribution function seems to have a reasonably good ﬁt for all eight years. The
shape of the cdf has clearly changed over time: the convex curve of 1965 has become linear in
2000, implying a decrease in inequality.
11 Plugging back k(L) into equations 2.1 and 2.3 yields the more intuitive expressions k(i) = k(L)(i/L)s and
F(k) = (k/k(L))1/s.
12 The data reported by Barro and Lee for 2000 are projections.
13 A list of these countries can be found in appendix B.











and s = b2.
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2000
a Population above 25; 1965-2000; data sources: Barro and Lee (2000), World Bank (WDI)
15In order to assess the robustness of this result, the cdf also has been estimated for weighting
schemes w2,w3, and w4. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the evolution of s and s, respectively. The
mean level of schooling has steadily increased over time for all four weighting schemes. This is
not very surprising since it is well-known that the average years of schooling has been rising
consistently in the last decades. More remarkable is the robust downward trend of s. Figure 2.3
shows that the decline in schooling inequality has been at least as pervasive as the rise in the
average level of education. The exact estimation results are reported in table 2.2.15 Results for
individual countries are reported in tables B.1 and B.2 of appendix B.
15 Considering the extremely small number of observations, I have omitted all of the usual test statistics, except for the
adjusted R2.
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a Population above 25; 1965-2000; data sources: Barro and Lee (2000), World Bank (WDI)
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a Population above 25; 1965-2000; data sources: Barro and Lee (2000), World Bank (WDI)
17Table 2.2 Estimation results for s and s
Year Statistic w1 w2 w3 w4
1965 s 2.16 1.40 2.61 2.96
s 0.30 0.40 0.27 0.23
R2
a 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
1970 s 1.98 1.28 2.39 2.72
s 0.32 0.42 0.29 0.24
R2
a 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98
1975 s 1.82 1.18 2.20 2.49
s 0.34 0.44 0.31 0.26
R2
a 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98
1980 s 1.34 0.87 1.55 1.87
s 0.41 0.52 0.39 0.32
R2
a 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.97
1985 s 1.26 0.82 1.46 1.76
s 0.43 0.53 0.41 0.34
R2
a 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.97
1990 s 1.15 0.75 1.33 1.61
s 0.45 0.56 0.44 0.36
R2
a 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98
1995 s 1.06 0.69 1.21 1.49
s 0.47 0.58 0.46 0.38
R2
a 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98
2000 s 1.00 0.65 1.14 1.40
s 0.49 0.60 0.48 0.40
R2
a 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98
Data sources: Barro and Lee (2000); World Bank (WDI)
183 The model










Here, instantaneous utility is assumed to equal the log of a consumption indexC. Consumers












The elasticity of substitution is determined by the parameter g.
The production of x requires an amount of human capital equivalent to Hx/n. Aggregate




The ﬂow of new goods depends on the amount of human capital available for research, Hn.
˙ n = Hn (3.4)
Entry into the research sector is free, meaning that the value of an invention, v, equals the wage
rate per unit of human capital, wn. Research is funded through the savings of consumers, who in
return get a share of the proﬁts, p, that an invention generates. The rate of return on investing in
research is p/v. The Ramsey rule that follows from utility maximisation is therefore given by




Here, ˆ C is the growth rate of consumption and gL is the (exogenous)growth rate of the
workforce (a hat denotes a growth rate; g is reserved for ﬁxed growth rates).
There are two types of jobs in the economy: research jobs and production jobs. Workers may
freely choose which type of job they take, but are assumed to choose the job that gives them the
highest income. Education is valuable for both kinds of jobs, but its effects on productivity differ
per job. The level of schooling of person i allows either for a production of hx (i) consumption
goods or for the invention of hn(i) new product designs. The exact speciﬁcations for a worker’s
productivity are
hx (i) = ak(i)




b = b˜ s
b (i/L)
sb (3.7)
˜ s ≡ (s +1)s,
where a,b > 0 and b > a ≥ 0. The latter condition ensures that the elasticity of output with
respect to schooling is higher for researchers than for production workers. With this setup,
19relatively highly educated people will end up in research. What remains to be determined is
what level of schooling marks the border between production workers and researchers.
The worker that is indifferent between a production job and a research job is indexed Lx,
such that the workers 0 through Lx produce consumption goods and the workers Lx through L
invent new products. The worker that is indifferent between production and research, must earn
the same income with both kinds of jobs.
wxhx (Lx) = wnhn(Lx) (3.8)
Here, wx is wage rate per unit of output in production, and wn is the wage rate per unit of output
in research. After substitution for hx and hn, the ratio of the wage rates can be seen to be related

















The aggregate amounts of human capital can be found by integration over the appropriate





























The proﬁt value ratio, p/v, follows from the zero proﬁt condition in research, v = wn, and














After substitution for the ratio of wage rates and human capital employed in production, the


























ˆ n+ ˆ Hx (3.15)
The growth rates of ˆ Hx and n can be obtained from 3.10 and 3.4 together with 3.11.
















16 The constants of integration are zero because without workers there will be no production.
20In the ﬁrst expression, gs is the exogenous growth rate of mean level of schooling (endogenous
growth of the mean schooling level is discussed in appendix A). Substitute for ˆ n and ˆ Hx to get












+ags +(sa +1) ˆ Lx −sagL (3.18)
Together, equations 3.14, 3.17, and 3.18 provide sufﬁcient information to study the dynamic
behavior of the model.
21224 Steady state
Before we proceed with the analysis of the dynamic properties of the model, let us ﬁrst rephrase
the condensed model formed by equations 3.14, 3.17, and 3.18 in order to reduce its complexity.
Deﬁne L ≡ Lx/L and l ≡ sbL/n. It turns out to be that the steady state of the model coincides






















l +ags +(sa +1) ˆ L+gL (4.3)





























The steady state of this system is characterised by a constant share of production workers in
the labor force, L, and a constant l. Setting ˆ l = 0 in 4.5 and ˆ L = 0 in 4.4 yields the steady state









[(1−g)gL+g r +(g a +(1−g)b)gs](sa +1)
(1−g)b(s +1)
b L∗−sb−1 (4.7)
The ﬁrst expression has been used to simplify the second expression. Equate both expressions





















The steady state growth rate of consumption can be retrieved either by substituting for l∗ in








As was to be expected of a semi-endogenousgrowth model, the growth rate of consumption in
the steady state depends on the growth rate of the population. In addition, consumption growth
depends on the growth rate of the mean level of education, such that steady state economic
23growth becomes feasible in the absence of population growth. Similar results have been obtained
by Arnold (1998) and Strulik (2005). The presence of education-drivengrowth is also reﬂected
by the fact that L∗ is smaller than one if population growth is zero but schooling growth is
positive (see equation 4.8). Even when the population is ﬁxed, researchers are employed and
new products are introduced to the market. This is why the steady state growth rate of
consumption is higher than the rate of productivity growth in the production sector as long as
gs > 0 (remember b > a). However, as both population growth and schooling growth are
exogenous, the label ‘semi-endogenous’is still appropriate.
The solution for gC in 4.11 could also have been found using a shortcut. The steady state
growth rates of ˆ Hx and ˆ n are given by
gHx = ags +gL (4.12)
gn = bgs +gL. (4.13)
Applying these growth rates to equation 3.15 immediately yields the steady state growth rate of
consumption. Above expressions clearly illustrate that growth in the average level of schooling
raises both the productivity of production workers and researchers. By doing so, advances in
education affect economic growth in much of the same way as population growth does.
24Figure 5.1 Change in the education of worker i due to a change in inequality
Schooling
dk








The steady state values of l and L have been derived in the previous section. Equations 4.8, 4.9,
and 4.10 show that the steady state values are dependent on s: schooling inequality matters for
the amount of research being done as well as the number of product types available for
consumption. The fact that s occurs several times in each of these equations indicates that the
impact of a change in s is quite complex. Below we will analyse the effects of a change in s on
the steady state in two steps.
In the ﬁrst step it will be shown how s affects the kind of job – production or research – that
is preferred by worker Lx, while keeping the wage rates constant. This effect of s on the labor
market is the skill effect mentioned in the introduction. With the second step it is shown how the
wage rates will adjust after the skill effect has taken place. The adjustment of the wage rates
naturally causes workers to reconsider their job choice. This second effect is the wage effect.
The two steps do not reﬂect the transitional dynamics of the model and are only used to make the
comparative static effects of a change in s more insightful.
5.1 Skill effect
A change in the shape of the schooling distribution may have a positive or a negative effect on
the schooling of person i, depending on his ranking. The education of person i will increase in







This condition is obtained by differentiating equation 2.1 with respect to s. A graphical
representation is given in ﬁgure 5.1.
A change in schooling affects the productivity of a worker, both for production and research.
A worker will be more inclined to do research if wxdhx < wndhn and he will be more inclined to
take a production job if wxdhx > wndhn (we keep wages ﬁxed for the moment). The change in
the relative attractiveness of the jobs can be found by differentiating equations 3.6 and 3.7 with










25Figure 5.2 Effect of a rise in education on income (constant wages) and domain of schooling for worker Lx
Income










Figure 5.3 The skill effect: Type of job chosen by worker Lx in response to a rise in inequality (constant wages)















A level of schooling that exceeds this value will encourage workers to do research. If the
education of a worker is below this value, a marginal increase in schooling will raise the
attractiveness of a production job. People with a low level of education beneﬁt from more
education because it makes them more productive in their current occupation. Their productivity
as a researcher remains very low, causing their wage gap between production and research to
widen in stead of diminish. The reverse applies to highly educated production workers. A rise in
their level of schooling will reduce the difference between their current income and the income
that they would earn in research. The ﬁrst line in ﬁgure 5.2 shows how the attractiveness of a job
depends on the education of the worker. The second line is the domain of the schooling level.
Only a part of this domain applies to the indifferent worker Lx.
In general, a change education can either raise or lower the attractiveness of a job in research,
depending on the level of schooling. However, there is only one worker that might actually
switch jobs: worker Lx. Can we be more speciﬁc about the incentives faced by Lx? Fortunately,
we can. Use equation 3.9 to solve for k (Lx) as a function of the ratio of wages and compare the


















This leaves us with the clean result that if the education of worker Lx increases, then he will
choose to be a researcher; if his education decreases, he will choose a job in production. This is
the skill effect: after a change in s, worker Lx can improve his income by switching jobs
because his level of schooling has changed. Figure 5.3 contains a graphical representation of this
result. The domain labeled ‘Production’ is where worker Lx chooses a production job; the
domain labeled ‘Research’ is where he chooses to become a researcher.
265.2 Wage effect
So far, we have analysed the effects of a change in inequality keeping wage rates constant.
However, a change in inequality is unlikely to leave wage rates unaffected. The underlying
reason is that a change in inequality will affect both types of human capital. If Hx and Hn
change, then – in general – there will be over- or under-investmentin research. When this
happens a change in wages is required to bring the economy back to the steady state.
The complexity of the model makes it impractical to discuss the impact of a change in s on
the wages through its effect on Hx and Hn. In stead, I will discuss the change in the wage rates
using the ratio of wage bills as this is mathematically more convenient. An expression for the
ratio of the wage bills can be derived using the equation for the wage ratio (3.9) in combination






















The convenient property of the wage bill ratio is that it is independent of s in the steady state. A
change in s will therefore only have temporary effects on the wage bill ratio.
If we differentiate the log of the wage bill ratio in equation 5.4 with respect to s while

























































are monotonically increasing in Lx/L. A higher s causes the wage bill
ratio to rise above its steady state value if the proportion of production workers is lower than L#;
the wage bill ratio will decline if Lx/L > L#. The ﬁrst line in ﬁgure 5.4 refers to this “capacity
effect” of a change in s on the wage bill ratio.
When the wage bill ratio deviates from its steady state value, an adjustment on the labor
market needs to take place to reach the steady state again. Suppose a rise in inequality leads to




















































an increase in the wage bill ratio, then a return to the steady state requires a decrease in the wage
bill for production relative to that of research. This can only be accomplished by a drop in wx
relative to wn. Alternatively, if L/Lx > L#, then the wage rate for researchers is too high relative
to the wage rate for production workers. The second line in ﬁgure 5.4 shows how wages adjust
to a change in s.
5.3 Overall effect
Above we have ﬁrst established the effect of a change in s on job choice keeping wage rates
constant. Second, we have established the effect of a change in s on the wage rates assuming
that the skill effect has already taken place, such that workers have chosen their jobs in
accordance with their education. Combining the two effects allows us to analyse the overall
comparative static effects of a rise in s. The overall comparative static effects are summarised in
ﬁgure 5.5. The skill effect is shown on the ﬁrst line, which is identical to ﬁgure 5.3. The second
line shows the wage effect assuming that the skill effect has already taken place.
The three dashed arrows represent three scenario’s for arriving at a new steady state when
inequality increases. The leftmost arrow shows the response of worker Lx if a large part of the
workforce is employed in research. First, worker Lx ﬁnds out that his level of education is lower,
which induces him to take a production job. Second, the new worker Lx is confronted with a
decline in wx/wn causing him to become a researcher. Which of the two effects is dominant
depends on the precise parameter values. The rightmost arrow describes the opposite situation.
Worker Lx experiences a rise in schooling and decides to do research. The second worker Lx
























sees a rise in wx/wn and takes a production job.





< Lx/L < L# like in ﬁgure 5.5, higher inequality will cause the




, then the shift
will be towards production.
5.4 Empirical evaluation
Figure 5.6 summarises the effects of a decline in schooling inequality. Not surprisingly, the
ﬁgure is a ‘mirror image’ of ﬁgure 5.5 as all effects work exactly in the opposite direction. The
theoretical analysis does not suggest that a decline in schooling inequality leads to a rise in the
proportion of researchers under all circumstances. In fact, the theory does not even ﬁx the
directions of the skill and wage effects. Ultimately, the link between schooling inequality and
the proportion of researchers in the workforce remains an empirical question.
The direction of the skill effect depends on the threshold value exp[−1/(s +1)]. The
estimates for s from section 2 can be used to compute this threshold. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the
estimated thresholds for the four weighting schemes and for individual countries, respectively.
The estimated thresholds are smaller than the actual share of researchers in the workforce (ﬁg.
1.1), which implies that the skill effect has a negative effect on the proportion of researchers.
Table 5.1 Estimation results for exp[−1/(s +1)]
Year w1 w2 w3 w4
1965 0.73 0.66 0.76 0.78
1970 0.72 0.65 0.74 0.76
1975 0.70 0.63 0.73 0.75
1980 0.65 0.59 0.68 0.71
1985 0.64 0.58 0.67 0.70
1990 0.63 0.56 0.65 0.68
1995 0.62 0.55 0.64 0.67
2000 0.61 0.55 0.63 0.66
Aggregate of OECD countries
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Country 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
AUS 0.65 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.59
AUT 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.62
BEL 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.69
CAN 0.69 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54
CHE 0.78 0.70 0.71 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.62
DEU 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.62
DNK 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.62
ESP 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.82 0.76 0.73 0.70
FIN 0.86 0.78 0.75 0.69 0.71 0.63 0.62 0.61
FRA 0.79 0.79 0.77 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.66
GBR 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.65
GRC 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.72 0.70
IRL 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.63
ISL 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.67
ITA 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.70
JPN 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.62 0.60
KOR 0.71 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.59
NLD 0.87 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.62
NOR 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.58 0.57 0.57
NZL 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.59
PRT 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.80
SWE 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.59 0.58
TUR 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.83
USA 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.52
Weighting scheme w1
With the skill effect working in the opposite direction, the rise of researcher therefore has to
stem from the wage effect. One indication for the presence of a wage effect is a change in the
ratio of the wage rates for high and low-skilled workers. In fact, wage inequality has been
growing substantially during the last decades – a fact that has been well documented in the
literature (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Murnane et al., 1995, and others).
306 Concluding remarks
During the last forty years the shape of the distribution of schooling has been changing. This has
led to a decline in schooling inequality. The theoretical analysis presented in this paper shows
that this development can have a variety of effects on the proportion of researchers in the
workforce. Whether the decline in schooling inequality has a positive effect on the proportion of
researchers therefore becomes an empirical question. The widely observed increase in the
college wage premium indicates that the decline in schooling inequality might indeed be
responsible for the rise of research.
The analysis has demonstrated that a rising proportion of researchers can be a steady state
phenomenon when schooling inequality is declining over time. This result contrasts with the
hypothesis of Jones (2002), who suggests that the rise of research is a consequence of advances
in the mean level of education. Further evidence is needed in order to be able to discriminate
between the two theories.
3132Appendix A Endogenous schooling growth
The assumption of section 3 that the average level of schooling grows at an exogenous and
constant rate, ˆ s = gs > 0, has been made for analytical convenience. However, in real life
education is not free and therefore growth in the mean level of education requires growth in
resources devoted to education. This appendix discusses two cases for which constant growth in
mean schooling is feasible in the steady state.
In order to avoid notational changes in the model, assume that the population, P, consists of
the normal workforce, L, and the part of the population being a teacher or student, Ps
(P = Ps +L). Furthermore, suppose that the change in mean level of education is affected by the
amount of human capital per capita that is available for education, Hs/P, and by a discount
factor, d. In particular, the change in mean education is given by ˙ s = Hs/P−ds. Human capital
depends on the people involved in education activities and on their average education, which is
assumed to equal that of the population: Hs = sePs, 0 ≥ e ≥ 1. (Better educated teachers will
teach more effectively; better educated students will learn quicker.) Substituting for Hs and
dividing by s gives an expression for ˆ s.




Deﬁne Ls ≡ Ps/P and take the growth rate of (ˆ s +d) to get
dln(ˆ s +d)/dt = (e −1) ˆ s + ˆ Ls. (A.2)
This last expression implies that there can be two speciﬁcations that allow for a constant and
positive growth rate of mean education in the steady state. First, e = 1 in combination with
ˆ Ps = ˆ P yields gs = L∗
s −d. With this speciﬁcation, growth in education stems entirely from the
positive effect of schooling as an input on schooling as an output, while the proportion of people
involved in education remains constant. This speciﬁcation has been proposed by Lucas (1988)
and Rosen (1976). See also Arnold (1998) and Strulik (2005).
Second, if e < 1, dln(ˆ s +d)/dt will go to zero as time proceeds. Setting dln(ˆ s +d)/dt = 0
yields ˆ s = 1
1−e ˆ Ls. Steady state schooling growth can only be positive if the proportion of the
population active in education is growing, but for this proportion to grow at a constant rate, the
population should grow at a different rate than the workforce. If both ˆ Ls and ˆ L are to be
constant, the population should grow according to ˆ P = gLs
Ps
L +gL.
The results presented above demonstrate that the growth rate of mean education can be
positive and constant in the steady state, but only under restrictive assumptions. A more detailed
and general treatment of the effects of schooling on economic growth is given by Bils and
Klenow (2000).
3334Appendix B Additional tables
Table B.1 Estimation results for the mean level of schooling (s) by country and year, uniform weights (w1)
Country 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
AUS 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.51
AUT 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.45
BEL 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.37
CAN 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.63
CHE 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.46
DEU 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.46
DNK 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.47
ESP 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.30 0.35
FIN 0.14 0.23 0.27 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.46 0.48
FRA 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.40
GBR 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.41
GRC 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34
IRL 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.42 0.44
ISL 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.39
ITA 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34
JPN 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.47 0.49
KOR 0.32 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.51
NLD 0.13 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.46
NOR 0.18 0.28 0.31 0.36 0.38 0.52 0.53 0.55
NZL 0.37 0.38 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.53
PRT 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.23
SWE 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.51 0.52
TUR 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.19
USA 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.65
Data source: Barro and Lee (2000)
35Table B.2 Estimation results for schooling inequality (s) by country and year, uniform weights (w1)
Country 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
AUS 1.29 1.04 1.09 1.07 1.03 1.01 0.97 0.91
AUT 1.74 1.80 1.79 1.29 1.26 1.22 1.17 1.09
BEL 2.81 2.72 2.45 2.21 2.01 1.85 1.79 1.71
CAN 1.66 1.27 1.01 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.67 0.61
CHE 2.94 1.84 1.91 1.22 1.21 1.17 1.11 1.07
DEU 1.39 1.42 1.65 1.41 1.23 1.20 1.12 1.08
DNK 1.28 1.32 1.30 1.28 1.26 1.07 1.15 1.08
ESP 13.09 11.02 8.20 4.81 3.90 2.70 2.16 1.78
FIN 5.67 3.11 2.44 1.73 1.92 1.20 1.10 1.02
FRA 3.32 3.25 2.90 2.04 1.83 1.76 1.59 1.42
GBR 3.26 2.46 2.08 1.93 1.74 1.57 1.44 1.34
GRC 8.11 6.95 5.54 3.46 2.84 2.40 2.07 1.78
IRL 2.99 2.91 2.70 1.81 1.64 1.37 1.27 1.18
ISL 5.74 4.32 3.29 2.61 2.17 1.88 1.65 1.47
ITA 5.90 4.86 4.22 2.78 2.45 2.19 1.97 1.80
JPN 2.03 2.35 1.93 1.50 1.37 1.13 1.06 0.98
KOR 1.90 1.44 1.16 0.99 0.91
NLD 6.10 1.61 1.58 1.49 1.37 1.27 1.16 1.09
NOR 3.87 2.34 1.99 1.63 1.50 0.81 0.79 0.76
NZL 1.43 1.38 0.93 0.85 0.85 1.02 0.96 0.90
PRT 19.87 12.26 8.45 7.15 5.43 4.31 3.95 3.41
SWE 2.09 2.03 1.83 1.36 1.31 1.23 0.89 0.86
TUR 14.73 13.44 11.29 8.30 6.91 5.90 4.37 4.35
USA 1.24 1.13 1.05 0.68 0.66 0.58 0.56 0.54
Data source: Barro and Lee (2000)
Table B.3 Country codes
AUS Australia FIN Finland KOR Republic of Korea
AUT Austria FRA France NLD Netherlands
BEL Belgium GBR United Kingdom NOR Norway
CAN Canada GRC Greece NZL New Zealand
CHE Switzerland IRL Ireland PRT Portugal
DEU Germany ISL Iceland SWE Sweden
DNK Denmark ITA Italy TUR Turkey
ESP Spain JPN Japan USA United States
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